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Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the 
Optimal Design of Executive Pay 
Jesse M. Fried
* 
This Article identifies a cost to public investors of tying executive pay to 
the future value of a firm’s stock—even its long-term value.  In particular, 
such  an  arrangement  can  incentivize  executives  to  engage  in  share 
repurchases (when the current stock price is low) and equity issuances (when 
the current stock price is high) that reduce “aggregate shareholder value”: 
the amount of value flowing to all the firm’s shareholders over time.  The 
Article also puts forward a mechanism that ties executive pay to aggregate 
shareholder value and thereby eliminates the identified distortions. 
 
I.  Introduction 
Public-company executives in the United States receive most of their 
pay in the form of equity compensation—restricted stock, stock options, and 
other incentives whose payoffs are tied to the future value of their firms’ 
shares.
1  Among S&P 500 CEOs in 2009, on average more than 60% of com-
pensation  came  in  the  form  of  restricted-stock  and  stock-option  grants.
2  
Equity-based  compensation  is  increasingly  common  in  other  countries  as 
well.
3 
The  purpose  of  equity  compensation  is  to  better  align  executives’ 
interests with those of the firm’s shareholders.
4  Tying executives’ payoffs 
more closely to the stock’s future value should give executives stronger in-
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centives to generate value for shareholders.
5  Not surprisingly, the use of 
equity-based  pay  has  long  been  encouraged  by  investors,  regulators,  and 
academics.
6 
Most compensation arrangements tie executive pay to the  short-term 
stock price.
7  Unfortunately, a stock’s short-term price does not necessarily 
reflect the stock’s long-term value.  Thus, over the last decade, there has 
been growing recognition that tying pay to the short-term stock price encour-
ages executives to focus on short-term results at the expense of long-term 
value.
8  But recognition of the problems associated with tying pay to the 
short-term stock price has not diminished enthusiasm for the use of equity 
compensation itself; rather, it has led commentators to emphasize the impor-
tance  of  tying  equity  payoffs  to  the  long-term  stock  price  (which,  the 
thinking goes, better reflects the stock’s long-term value).
9 
This Article identifies a different and more subtle economic problem 
with equity pay—a problem that arises whenever an executive’s payoff is 
tied  to  the  future  value  of  a  firm’s  stock,  even  its  long-term  value.    In 
particular, the Article shows that tying payoffs to the stock’s future value 
fails  to  reward  executives  for  maximizing  what  I  have  called  “aggregate 
shareholder  value”:  the  amount  of  value  flowing  to  all  of  the  firm’s 
shareholders over time.
10  Indeed, I show that tying an executive’s payoff to 
the  stock’s  future  value,  even  its  long-term  value,  can  encourage  the 
 
5. Id. 
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and 
the  Case  for  Shareholder  Opt-In,  46  HARV.  J.  ON  LEGIS.  323,  352  (2009)  (reporting  that  the 
widespread adoption  of  stock  options  in  the  1990s  resulted,  in  part,  from  institutional  investor 
pressure on firms); Jensen & Murphy, supra note 4, at 141 (urging boards to use more stock options 
to better tie equity pay to performance). 
7. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 176–77 (2004) (describing executives’ ability to unwind 
stock options and restricted shares as soon as they vest). 
8. See, e.g., id. at 184 (analyzing problems resulting from the broad freedom of executives to 
unload equity incentives in the short term). 
9. See, e.g., id. at 175 (suggesting that executives be required to hold stock for the long term); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
1915,  1928–36  (2010)  (putting  forward  more  detailed  recommendations  for  long-term  holding 
requirements and explaining that executives should be allowed to unwind only a small fraction of 
their equity each year); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming  Executive  Compensation: 
Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361 (2009) (suggesting that 
executives be paid only with restricted stock and stock options that cannot be unwound until after 
retirement). 
10. See Jesse M. Fried, Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market Repurchases, 
93 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1331 (2005).  Aggregate shareholder value is the net cash flow from the 
firm to all of the firm’s shareholders over time, where net cash flow equals the cash received by 
shareholders from the firm via dividends and share repurchases less any cash paid by shareholders 
to the firm for their shares.  I use the term aggregate shareholder value rather than shareholder 
value because shareholder value may be taken to mean the value flowing to the firm’s current 
shareholders. 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1115 
 
 
 
executive  to  take  steps  that  destroy  aggregate  shareholder  value  (and 
therefore economic or “social” value
11). 
The Article describes and analyzes two distortions caused by tying an 
executive’s payoff to a stock’s future value.  First, when the stock’s current 
price is below its actual value, an executive whose pay is tied to the stock’s 
future value can be rewarded for diverting cash from productive investments 
in the firm to fund bargain-price share repurchases.  I call this distortion—
which  involves  socially  excessive  cash  distributions  by  the  firm—“costly 
contraction.”  
Second, when the stock’s current price is higher than its actual value, 
the executive can be rewarded for issuing new shares even if the cash or 
other assets received for the newly issued shares cannot be used productively 
by the firm.  I term this distortion—which involves socially excessive in-
vestment  by  the  firm—“costly  expansion.”    Both  costly  contraction  and 
costly expansion can boost the stock’s future value and executives’ payouts 
even as they destroy aggregate shareholder value. 
The reason why tying executive pay to the stock’s future value leads to 
these two distortions is straightforward.  Tying pay to the stock’s future value 
aligns  an  executive’s  interests  with  the  interests  of  only  one  group  of 
shareholders, whom I call “nontrading shareholders”: investors who neither 
sell any of their shares nor buy any additional shares until the executive re-
ceives the value of her shares.  It fails to align the executive’s interests with 
those of two other groups of shareholders: (1) “redeeming shareholders”—
investors who sell shares to the firm before the executive cashes out her 
equity,  and  (2) “investing  shareholders”—investors  who  buy  (additional) 
shares from the firm before the executive’s cash-out date.  Thus, tying an 
executive’s pay to the stock’s future value rewards the executive for transfer-
ring  value  to  nontrading  shareholders  from  redeeming  shareholders  (by 
buying the latter’s shares at a low price) and from investing shareholders (by 
selling  them  shares  at  an  inflated  price),  even  if  aggregate  shareholder 
value—the amount of value flowing to all three groups of shareholders—is 
thereby diminished.
12 
 
11. For purposes of this Article, I assume that the firm’s current and future shareholders are the 
only  residual  claimants  to  the  firm’s  cash  flow  and  thus  that  aggregate  shareholder  value  is 
equivalent to social value.  I will thus use the terms “aggregate shareholder value” and “social 
value”  interchangeably.    This  assumption,  made  purely  for  expositional  convenience,  does  not 
affect the Article’s analysis of the distortions caused by tying executives’ payoffs to the stock’s 
future value, or the desirability of the constant-share proposal this Article puts forward. 
12. Tying  pay  to  the  stock’s  future value  also  fails  to  tie  executives’  payoffs  to  the  value 
flowing to two other groups of shareholders: (1) shareholders who sell their shares in the market 
before the executive’s cash-out date and (2) the investors who buy these selling shareholders’ stock.  
However, the cash that changes hands when investors buy and sell a firm’s shares to each other in 
the  secondary  market  does  not  affect  aggregate  shareholder  value—the  total  amount  of  value 
flowing from the firm to shareholders over time.  Rather, trading in the secondary market merely 
redistributes value among different shareholders.  Thus, these shareholders’ returns can be ignored 1116  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
I also put forward a mechanism that would perfectly tie executive pay to 
aggregate shareholder value: the “constant-share” approach to equity pay.  
Under this approach, an executive would be required to adjust her equity 
holdings in the firm whenever the firm purchases or sells its own shares to 
keep her percentage ownership constant through the transaction.  Thus, the 
executive would be required to sell some of her shares whenever the firm 
repurchases its own stock and to buy additional shares when the firm issues 
new equity. 
In  essence,  the  constant-share  approach  requires  the  executive  to 
participate  equally  as  both  a  redeeming  shareholder  and  as  a  nontrading 
shareholder  when  the  firm  repurchases  shares,  and  as  both  an  investing 
shareholder and a nontrading shareholder when the firm issues shares.  The 
constant-share approach thus ties the executive’s payoff to the value flowing 
to all of the firm’s shareholders and rewards the executive for engaging in 
repurchases and equity issuances if and only if those transactions increase 
aggregate shareholder value.
13 
Before  proceeding,  I  would  like  to  be  clear  about  the  normative 
assumptions underlying this Article’s analysis.  Consistent with standard and 
widely used notions of efficiency that underlie most of the economically ori-
ented  scholarship  on  corporate  governance,  I  assume  that  executive-
compensation  arrangements  should  reward  executives  for  generating—not 
destroying—social value.
14  Thus, as Michael Jensen has argued, executives 
should not be incentivized to redistribute value from future shareholders to 
current shareholders (or from one group of current shareholders to another) 
in ways that reduce social value, even if some of the firm’s current share-
holders are made better off.
15 
I  would  also  like  to  indicate  my  objectives  in  this  Article.    Actual 
implementation  of  the  constant-share  approach  at  any  given  firm  would 
require  certain  technical  adjustments
16  as  well  as  the  adoption  of  anti-
circumvention  arrangements—issues  that  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
 
when  analyzing  the  extent  to  which  equity  compensation  ties  executives’  payoffs  to  aggregate 
shareholder value. 
13. In  this  Article,  I  abstract  from  the  question  of  how  much—and  what  elements  of—
aggregate shareholder value should be paid to executives.  That is, I do not consider here how much 
equity executives should receive, whether equity pay should take the form of stock or options, or the 
extent to which the payoffs from these instruments should be designed to filter out changes in the 
stock price that are due to market-wide or industry-wide fluctuations. 
14. Cf.  William  T.  Allen  et  al.,  COMMENTARIES  AND  CASES  ON  THE  LAW  OF  BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 7 (3d ed. 2009) (urging the  use of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as the criterion for 
evaluating corporate law and corporate governance arrangements). 
15. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 16 (2005) 
(arguing that managers and the board should treat all shareholders—including future shareholders— 
equally to maximize the firm’s long-run economic value). 
16. For example, much of an executive’s equity is likely to consist of vested stock options and 
unvested shares and stock options. Measuring the executive’s proportional equity ownership would 
require assigning share-equivalents to these instruments. 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1117 
 
 
 
Article.  I am thus not advocating adoption of any particular arrangement 
here.  Rather, my goals in this Article are as follows: (1) to demonstrate that, 
just as there is a potential economic cost associated with tying executive pay 
to the short-term stock price, there is a potential economic cost associated 
with  tying  executive  pay  to  the  stock’s  future  value—even  its  long-term 
value—when  the  company  repurchases  or  issues  shares;  and  (2) to  show 
conceptually  how  compensation  arrangements  should  be  structured  to  tie 
executive pay to the value generated by a firm for its shareholders over time. 
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows.  Part II explains 
why  equity  pay  can  give  executives  an  incentive  to  engage  in  excessive 
repurchases.  It begins by showing that tying executive pay to the stock’s 
future value rewards executives for engaging in repurchases when the stock’s 
current price is below its actual value.  It next explains how repurchases can 
reduce aggregate shareholder value by distributing cash that should be in-
vested  in  the  firm’s  own  projects.    It  concludes  by  demonstrating  that 
executives holding stock can be rewarded for conducting bargain-price re-
purchases even when those repurchases destroy social value. 
Part III explains how equity pay gives executives an incentive to engage 
in excessive equity issuances.  It begins by showing that tying executive pay 
to the stock’s future value rewards executives for issuing equity when it is 
overpriced.    It  then  demonstrates  that  the  investments  financed  by  such 
equity  issuances  can  reduce  social  value.    It  concludes  by  showing  that 
executives can be rewarded for inflated-price equity issuances even if the 
investments financed by these issuances destroy social value. 
Part  IV  introduces  the  constant-share  approach  to  equity  pay,  under 
which  executives  must  maintain  their  proportional  ownership  as  the  firm 
transacts in its own stock.  Such an approach, it shows, eliminates the incen-
tive to engage in costly contraction and costly expansion created by tying 
executives’ payoffs to the stock’s future value.  A conclusion follows. 
II.  Equity Pay and Costly Contraction 
In this Part, I explain why tying executive payoffs to the stock’s future 
value, even its long-term value, can reward executives for engaging in repur-
chases that reduce social value.  Subpart A briefly discusses the growing use 
of  repurchases  as  a  means  to  distribute  cash  to  shareholders.    Subpart B 
shows that executives holding stock in the firm have a strong incentive to 
undertake repurchases when the firm’s current stock price is below its actual 
value,  and  it  summarizes  the  considerable  evidence  that  executives  fre-
quently  conduct  such  bargain-price  repurchases.    Subpart C  explains  how 
repurchases can reduce social value by diverting cash from valuable firm 
projects.  Subpart D demonstrates that executives holding stock in the firm 
can be rewarded for engaging in such value-wasting repurchases when the 
current stock price is sufficiently low. 1118  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
A.  Widespread Use of Repurchases 
Publicly  traded  U.S.  firms  annually  generate  hundreds  of  billions  of 
dollars in earnings.
17  Each year, firms must decide how much of their re-
tained earnings should be distributed to shareholders rather than left in the 
firm.  Executives must also decide the form that such distribution should 
take: dividends, repurchases, or a combination of both.
18 
Share  repurchases  have  become  increasingly  common  and  are  now 
considered the dominant form of cash payout.
19  Over 90% of U.S. public 
firms that distribute cash engage in repurchases.
20  In 2007, S&P 500 firms 
distributed almost $600 billion through repurchases.
21 
A repurchase will typically take one of two forms: (1) an “open market 
repurchase” (OMR), in which the firm buys its own stock on the market 
through a broker,
22 or (2) a “repurchase tender offer” (RTO), in which the 
firm offers to buy back its own stock directly from shareholders, usually at a 
premium over the market price.
23  Because over 90% of repurchases take the 
form of OMRs,
24 my analysis focuses primarily on OMRs.
25 
Economists  believe  that  the  growing  use  of  repurchases  rather  than 
dividends is likely the result of the widespread use of stock options to com-
 
17. See Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution 
Hypothesis, 57 J. FIN. 1649, 1655 tbl.1 (2002) (reporting annual aggregate earnings of U.S. firms 
from 1972 through 2000). 
18. See generally Douglas J. Skinner, The Evolving Relation Between Earnings, Dividends, and 
Stock Repurchases, 87  J.  FIN.  ECON.  582 (2008)  (comparing  the  percentages  of  firms  that pay 
dividends, firms that repurchase shares, and firms that do both). 
19. See id. at 584.  
20. See Gustavo Grullon & David L. Ikenberry, What Do We Know About Stock Repurchases?, 
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 2000, at 31, 33–34 (reporting that in the 1990s additional cash flows 
were  channeled  into  share  repurchases  instead  of  dividends);  Skinner,  supra  note  20,  at  583 
(explaining that in 2005 only 7% of firms paid dividends and did not distribute any cash through 
repurchases). 
21. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, S&P 500 Buybacks Set Record of $589 Billion in 2007 
(Apr. 7,  2008),  available  at  http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/040708_SP500_ 
BUYBACK_PR.pdf; see also Paul A. Griffin & Ning Zhu, Accounting Rules?  Stock Buybacks and 
Stock  Options:  Additional  Evidence,  6 J.  CONTEMP.  ACCT.  &  ECON.  1,  1 (2010)  (reporting  $1 
trillion of repurchases market wide in 2007). 
22. Jesse M. Fried, Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market Repurchases, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1335 (2005). 
23. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 421 (2000). 
24. See Monica L. Banyi et al., Errors in Estimating Share Repurchases, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 460, 
460 (2008) (reporting that since 1996 open market repurchase programs have accounted for 88% of 
all announced repurchase programs, and the announced value of these open market repurchases has 
been over 93% of the total reported value of repurchase programs); Grullon & Ikenberry, supra 
note 22, at 33–34 & fig.1 (reporting that between 1980 and 1999, open-market programs comprised 
about 92% of the total repurchase announcements and 91% of the total value of all repurchase 
announcements). 
25. However, for purposes of this Article, the mechanism by which firms repurchase stock is 
irrelevant.   2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1119 
 
 
 
pensate executives.
26  Stock options provide a payoff equal to the difference 
between the (usually fixed) exercise price and the exercise-date stock price.
27  
A dividend reduces firm assets without affecting the number of shares.
28  As 
a result, a dividend reduces per-share value and the share price, thereby di-
minishing the value of an executive’s stock options.
29 
A repurchase, in contrast, does not reduce per-share value (as much or 
at all) because it decreases firm assets and the number of shares outstanding 
by approximately the same proportion.
30  Executives compensated with stock 
options are thus biased in favor of repurchases.
31  Not surprisingly, execu-
tives with larger option packages tend to pay lower dividends and distribute 
more cash through share repurchases.
32 
However,  as  I  explain  below,  even  absent  this  stock-option  bias, 
executives will often have an incentive to prefer repurchases over dividends.  
In particular, any executive whose payoff is tied to the stock’s future value 
will get a larger payoff by engaging in a bargain-price repurchase than by 
issuing a dividend. 
 
26. See, e.g., George W. Fenn & Nellie Liang, Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock 
Incentives, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 45, 48 (2001) (finding a statistically significant positive relationship 
between repurchases and management stock options, and concluding that management stock options 
help explain the rise in repurchases at the expense of dividends).  Repurchases may also offer 
shareholders a number of possible advantages over dividends.  In many cases, they are a more tax-
efficient mechanism than dividends for distributing cash.  Repurchases (unlike dividends) also may 
enable firms to acquire shares for increasingly popular stock-option plans or provide liquidity to a 
firm’s  selling  shareholders.    See  Fried,  supra  note 24,  at  1336–40  (describing  the  possible 
advantages of repurchases over dividends and explaining why many of the advantages are likely to 
be quite modest). 
27. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau 
of  Econ.  Research,  Working  Paper  No.  6467,  1998),  available  at  http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w6467.pdf (describing the structure of stock options and exploring how this structure affects 
management incentives). 
28. Id. 
29. Id.  One could preserve the value of an executive’s stock option following a dividend by 
reducing the exercise price by the amount of the dividend.  However, for various reasons such 
dividend adjustments are uncommon.  See Kathleen M. Kahle, When a Buyback Isn’t a Buyback: 
Open Market Repurchases and Employee Options, 63 J. FIN. ECON. 235, 242 n.2 (2002) (“[O]nly 
1% of CEOs with options have dividend protection.” (citation omitted)).  Thus, dividends typically 
reduce the value of an executive’s stock options.  Jolls, supra note 29, at 2. 
30. Jolls, supra note 31, at 1. 
31. Fenn & Liang, supra note 30, at 65.  Executives paid with restricted stock will also have an 
incentive to repurchase shares rather than issue dividends if the executives are not entitled to receive 
the value of any dividends paid while the restricted stock is vesting. However, most executives 
compensated with restricted stock appear to be entitled to receive dividends while the stock is still 
vesting.   See Phyllis Plitch,  Executives  Find Restricted Stock  Pays  Dividends  from the  Get-Go, 
WALL  ST.  J.,  Feb. 28,  2005,  at  C3  (reporting  an  estimate  that  90%  of  U.S.  publicly  traded 
companies award dividends on unvested restricted stock). 
32. Fenn & Liang, supra note 30, at 47–48. 1120  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
B.  Using Repurchases to Buy Low 
Executives whose payoff is tied to the future value of their firm’s stock 
have a strong incentive to repurchase stock when the stock’s current price is 
below its actual value.  Indeed, there is substantial evidence that executives 
frequently  engage  in  bargain-price  repurchases.  Even  though  firms  are 
required  to  announce  their  intent  to  repurchase  shares,  underpricing  can 
persist after such announcements are made.  
1.  Executives’ Payoffs.—As I have shown elsewhere,
33 a repurchase is 
economically  equivalent  to  the  following  two-step  transaction:  First, 
redeeming (selling) shareholders sell their shares to nontrading (continuing) 
shareholders  directly  at  the  repurchase  price.    Second,  the  firm  issues  a 
dividend  to  nontrading  shareholders  equal  to  the  dollar  amount  of  the 
repurchase.  Thus, a bargain-price repurchase transfers value from redeeming 
shareholders  to  continuing  shareholders,  including  executives  holding  the 
firm’s equity.
34 
A  simple  example  can  be  used  to  illustrate  how  a  bargain-price 
repurchase transfers value to executives holding equity in the firm.  Consider 
ABC Corporation (ABC) that has two shares outstanding and is liquidated at 
Liquidation Date.
35  One share is held by its CEO.  The other share is held by 
public shareholders.  Consider two scenarios: 
  No-Transaction Scenario: Suppose that if ABC does not repurchase any 
of its equity prior to Liquidation Date, it will distribute $20 to the holders of 
its  two  shares  at  Liquidation  Date.    The  no-transaction  value  of  each  of 
ABC’s two shares at Liquidation Date is thus $10. 
  Repurchase Scenario: Now suppose that ABC can conduct a repurchase 
before Liquidation Date when the stock trades at $8 ($2 less than its actual 
value of $10), buying back public shareholders’ single share at that price.  
Assume that the $8 spent on the repurchase reduces ABC’s Liquidation Date 
value from $20 to $12.  At Liquidation Date, the value of ABC’s remaining 
share (held by CEO) is thus $12. 
It should be easy to see that the bargain-price repurchase boosts CEO’s 
payout  without  increasing  social  value—the  value  flowing  to  ABC’s 
shareholders  over  time.    In  both  the  No-Transaction  and  Repurchase 
 
33. Fried, supra note 10, at 1344–46. 
34. When a firm buys stock at a price below its actual value, the precise distributional effects 
depend  on  whether  the  redeeming  shareholders  would  have  otherwise  sold  their  shares  to  new 
investors for the same price.  If so, the redeeming shareholder cannot be said to “lose” any value as 
a result of the bargain-price repurchase.  Instead, the repurchase deprives would-be new investors of 
a gain.  For simplicity, however, I will assume that it is the redeeming shareholders that lose money 
as the result of the bargain-price repurchase. 
35.  I assume that ABC does not issue any dividends (or sell any equity) before Liquidation 
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Scenarios,  ABC’s  social  value  is  $20.
36  But  CEO’s  payout  in  the  No-
Transaction Scenario is only $10, while in the Repurchase Scenario it is $12.  
The results are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Rewards for Bargain-Price Repurchase 
  Social Value  CEO Payoff 
No Repurchase  $20  $10 
 Repurchase  $20  $12 
 
2.  Evidence  of  Bargain  Repurchases.—Having  seen  that  executives 
holding equity have an incentive to conduct bargain repurchases, I now turn 
to  the  considerable  empirical  evidence  that  they  do  so.    This  evidence 
includes  (a) executives’  own  statements  and  behavior,  and  (b) stock-price 
movements following repurchase announcements. 
a.  Executives’  Own  Statements  and  Behavior.—Executives  admit 
that  they  frequently  use  repurchases  to  buy  stock  when  it  is  cheap.  
According  to  the  authors  of  a  major  2005  survey  of  financial  executives 
regarding their firms’ payout policies, “[t]he most popular response for all 
repurchase questions on the entire survey is that firms repurchase when their 
stock is a good value, relative to its true value: 86.4% of all firms agree or 
strongly  agree  with  this  supposition.”
37  The  authors  reported  that 
“executives tell us that they accelerate (or initiate) share repurchases when 
their company’s stock price is low.”
38 
Empirical studies confirm that executives’ desire to buy stock at a low 
price is linked to their equity ownership.  One study found that abnormal 
returns following repurchase announcements, which are associated with pre-
repurchase  underpricing,  are  positively  correlated  with  pre-buyback 
executive  stock  ownership.
39  Another  found  that  relatively  infrequent 
repurchase announcers—those firms that are more likely to be engaged in 
 
36.  In the No-Transaction Scenario, all $20 flows to shareholders at Liquidation Date.  In the 
Repurchase Scenario, $8 flows to shareholders during the repurchase and $12 flows to shareholders 
at Liquidation Date (for a total of $20).  Throughout the examples in this Article, I ignore the time 
value of money (or alternatively, assume it is zero).  This assumption, made purely for convenience, 
does not affect the analysis. 
37. Alon Brav et al., Payout Policy in the 21st Century, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 483, 514 (2005). 
38. Id.  Earlier studies yielded similar responses.  When asked in a 1988 survey to name the 
most  important  circumstance  precipitating  a  repurchase  was,  66%  of  the  surveyed  executives 
responded “low stock price,” six times as many as those offering the next most popular answer, 
“need for treasury stock.”  George P. Tsetsekos et al., A Survey of Stock Repurchase Motivations 
and Practices of Major U.S. Corporations, 7 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 15, 17–18 tbl.2 (1991). 
39. See Elias Raad & H.K. Wu, Insider Trading Effects on Stock Returns Around Open-Market 
Stock Repurchase Announcements: An Empirical Study, 18 J. FIN. RES. 45, 57 (1995).  1122  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
bargain repurchasing than repurchasing shares to acquire stock for employee-
option programs—also tend to have higher levels of executive ownership.
40  
Both of these studies indicate that executives are more likely to engage in 
bargain-price repurchases when executives hold more equity. 
Moreover, executives actively manipulate earnings to drive the stock 
price down around repurchases and thereby increase the amount of value 
transferred  to  themselves  and  other  non-selling  shareholders.
41  Such 
earnings manipulation is more aggressive when the CEO’s equity ownership 
is higher, providing additional evidence that executives conduct repurchases 
to boost the value of their equity.
42 
One might wonder why insider trading laws do not prevent executives 
from  engaging  in  such  indirect  insider  trading.    But  as  I  have  explained 
elsewhere,
43  there  are  substantial  limits  on  the  law’s  ability  to  deter 
corporations  from  using  inside  information  to  trade  in  their  own  stock.
44  
Executives are thus left with considerable ability to use the corporation for 
indirect insider trading when the stock price is below its actual value. 
b.  Post-announcement  Stock  Returns.—Stock-price  movements 
following  repurchase  announcements  also  suggest  that  inside  information 
drives many repurchases.  If executives use repurchases to buy stock at a low 
price, the stock prices of firms announcing repurchases should, on average, 
subsequently outperform those of firms not announcing repurchases.  Indeed, 
stock prices of firms announcing repurchases increase faster than stock prices 
of similar firms not announcing repurchases.  One study found that shares of 
firms announcing repurchases earn abnormal returns of 6.7% in the first year 
following the announcement and 23.6% over the subsequent four years.
45 
Post-announcement returns are even higher in those firms that actually 
repurchase shares after making a repurchase announcement.
46  Focusing on 
 
40. See  Murali  Jagannathan  &  Clifford  Stephens,  Motives  for  Multiple  Open-Market 
Repurchase Programs, 32 FIN. MGMT. 71, 71–72 (2003). 
41. See  Guojin  Gong,  Henock  Louis  &  Amy  X.  Sun,  Earnings  Management  and  Firm 
Performance Following Open-Market Repurchases, 63 J. FIN. 947, 983 (2008) (reporting that firms 
adjust accruals to decrease their reported earnings before stock repurchases). 
42. Id. 
43. Fried, supra note 10, at 1343. 
44. Indeed,  it  is  not  completely  clear  under  current  law  whether  it  is  ever  illegal  for  a 
corporation  to  buy  its  own  stock  in  the  public  markets  on  inside  information.    See  Mark J. 
Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 
70–72  (2005)  (noting  that  the  SEC  takes  the  position  that  an  issuer  trading  on  material  inside 
information would violate Rule 10b-5 but that this position has not been endorsed by any court). 
45. Konan Chan et al., Economic Sources of Gain in Stock Repurchases, 39 J. FIN. & QUANT. 
ANALYSIS 461, 463 (2004); see also Urs Peyer & Theo Vermaelen, The Nature and Persistence of 
Buyback Anomalies, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1693, 1701 (2009) (finding, in a large sample of firms 
announcing OMRs, a 24.25% cumulative market-adjusted return over 48 months following OMR 
announcements). 
46. Chan et al., supra note 51, at 476.  After making a repurchase announcement, which is not 
binding, executives can choose how much (if any) equity to actually repurchase.  See Fried, supra 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1123 
 
 
 
“value firms” (firms with a high book-to-market ratio) that had announced 
repurchases,  one  study  found  that  among  the  firms  in  which  managers 
subsequently  repurchased  more  than  4%  of  the  firm’s  shares  in  the  year 
following  the  repurchase  announcement,  four-year  post-announcement 
abnormal returns were 57%.  For value firms that announced a repurchase 
but  did  not  subsequently  repurchase  any  shares,  the  authors  of  the  study 
could  not  find  any  evidence  of  post-announcement  abnormal  returns.
47  
These  post-announcement  returns  provide  further  strong  evidence  (along 
with executives’ own statements and their behavior) that executives often use 
repurchases to indirectly buy underpriced stock. 
3.  Why Bargain Pricing Persists After Repurchase Announcements.—
Because  executives  often  use  repurchases  to  buy  stock  at  a  low  price,  a 
repurchase announcement will tend to signal that the value of the stock is 
higher than the current market price.  This signal, in turn, can be expected to 
boost the stock price, reducing the amount of underpricing and executives’ 
ability to profit from a bargain-price repurchase.  Indeed, if a repurchase 
announcement  clearly  signaled  a  certain  amount  of  underpricing,  the 
announcement  should—in  an  efficient  market—immediately  eliminate  the 
underpricing. 
However, investors do not appear to immediately impart the information 
contained in repurchase announcements into the stock price, just as they do 
not immediately impart other types of information into the stock price.
48  The 
failure  of  shareholders  to  immediately  react  to  certain  types  of  public 
information has been labeled by economists  “investor underreaction.”
49  In 
short, markets are not as efficient as some commentators might believe. 
Moreover,  even  if  markets  were  efficient  at  processing  publicly 
available  information,  bargain  pricing  would  still  persist  after  repurchase 
announcements.  A buyback announcement does not unambiguously signal 
that the stock is underpriced because boards may announce a buyback even 
 
note 10, at 1335 (explaining that firms announcing authorization of open-market repurchases are not 
required to indicate the number of shares they intend to repurchase or to commit to repurchasing 
any shares). 
47. See Konan Chan et al., Do Managers Time the Market? Evidence from Open-Market Share 
Repurchases, 31 J. BANKING FIN. 2673, 2676, 2686–88 (2007).  For other studies indicating that 
executives in the United States and elsewhere tend to repurchase stock when it is underpriced, see 
Paul Brockman & Dennis Y. Chung, Managerial Timing and Corporate Liquidity: Evidence from 
Actual  Share  Repurchases,  61  J.  FIN.  ECON.  417,  418  (2001),  and  Clifford P.  Stephens  & 
Michael S. Weisbach, Actual Share Reacquisitions in  Open-Market Repurchase Programs, 53 J. 
FIN. 313, 313 (1998). 
48. See David Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases, 39 J. 
FIN. ECON. 181, 183 (1995) (discussing delayed market reactions to announcements of important 
corporate events such as repurchases, mergers, proxy contests, and spinoffs). 
49. See,  e.g.,  Harrison  Hong  &  Jeremy  C.  Stein,  A  Unified  Theory  of  Underreaction, 
Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets, 54 J. FIN. 2143, 2143 (1999); Ikenberry, 
supra note 53, at 183. 1124  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
when  the  stock  is  not  underpriced.    For  example,  as  I  have  explained 
elsewhere, executives might announce a repurchase program that they have 
no plan to actually conduct simply to boost the stock price so they can unload 
their own shares at a higher price.
50  Indeed, a recent paper finds evidence of  
such “false signaling.”
51  To the extent repurchase announcements are made 
for  reasons  other  than  conducting  bargain  repurchases,  the  resulting 
adjustment  to  the  stock  price  will  not  completely  eliminate  any 
underpricing—even if the market is efficient.
52   
Because of the underreaction problem and the fact that some repurchase 
announcements are not driven by the desire to buy stock at a low price, the 
market response to repurchase announcements is, on average, rather muted.  
Repurchase announcements are associated with short-term abnormal price 
increases averaging 3% to 4% in the 1980s
53 and approximately 2% in the 
1990s.
54  The  more  muted  the  market’s  response  to  a  repurchase 
announcement,  the  more  profits  executives  can  reap  repurchasing 
underpriced stock.   
C.  The Possibility of Costly Repurchases 
We have just seen that executives whose payoff is tied to the stock’s 
future value have incentives to engage in bargain repurchases even if those 
repurchases do not increase social value.  In addition, there is considerable 
evidence  that  executives  do  engage  in bargain  repurchases.
55  I  will  now 
explain how repurchases (whether or not they are bargain priced) can reduce 
social value. 
 
50. See Fried, supra note 10, at 1351–56 (developing the argument that executives can use 
repurchase  announcements  for  false  signaling  and  providing  anecdotal  accounts  of  such  false 
signaling); Jesse M. Fried, Open Market Repurchases: Signaling or Managerial Opportunism?, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 865, 879–81 (2001) (explaining that executives can use repurchase 
announcements  to  boost  the  stock  price  before  selling  their  shares).  Alternatively,  firms  may 
announce a repurchase because they need to repurchase shares for employee stock-option programs. 
51. See Konan Chan et al., Share Repurchases as a Potential Tool to Mislead Investors, 16 J. 
CORP. FIN. 137, 139 (2010) (finding evidence consistent with the notion of executives of poorly 
performing  firms  making  share  repurchase  announcements  without  an  intention  to  repurchase 
shares). 
52. Because  of  the  problem  of  false  signaling,  I  have  suggested  that  firms  be  required  to 
disclose not only their intention to repurchase shares but also the exact details of any buy orders 
given to brokers shortly before the orders are placed.  Fried, supra note 10, at 1330.  Such a pre-
disclosure rule would increase the accuracy of price adjustments to repurchase announcements and 
reduce the amount of underpricing when the stock’s price is below its actual value. 
53. See Ikenberry et al., supra note 55, at 190 (reporting that the average market reaction to 
OMR announcements for all of the OMRs announced between January 1980 and December 1990 by 
firms listed on the ASE, NYSE, and NASDAQ was 3.54%). 
54. See  Peyer  &  Vermaelen,  supra  note  51,  at  1697  (finding  that,  in  a  sample  of  OMR 
announcements from 1991–2001, there were average abnormal stock price reactions of 2.39% in the 
three days around the announcement). 
55. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1125 
 
 
 
1.  How  Repurchases  Can  Reduce  Social  Value.—A  repurchase  can 
reduce social value by distributing cash that, from a social perspective, could 
generate higher returns if invested in the firm’s own projects.  Suppose, for 
example, that $100 left in the firm would generate a return of 15% ($15).  
Suppose  that  if  instead  the  $100  were  distributed  to  shareholders,  the 
shareholders receiving the cash could generate returns of only 10% ($10) 
outside the firm.  Distributing the $100 through a repurchase would thus 
destroy $5 of social value. 
In fact, there is evidence consistent with repurchases diverting cash that 
would otherwise be used in the firm.  A recent study found that repurchases, 
especially those that appear to be driven by executive stock ownership, have 
a  significantly  negative  effect  on  a  firm’s  short-term  investments  and 
research and development.
56  The study found that, everything else equal, 
doubling repurchases led to an 8% reduction in research-and-development 
expenditures.    An  earlier  study  came  to  similar  conclusions—that 
repurchases  led  to  firms  diverting  cash  from  potentially  productive 
investments.
57 
To be sure, these two studies do not establish that most repurchases 
destroy social value.  But the studies do provide evidence that repurchases 
can  divert  cash  from  productive  activities  inside  the  firm,  increasing  the 
likelihood that some repurchases distribute cash that would generate more 
social value inside the firm. 
2.  Constraints on Firm Borrowing.—One might wonder why a firm that 
has a valuable project and whose stock trades at a low price cannot have its 
cake and eat it too.  Indeed, in a world of perfect capital markets, there would 
be  no  need  to  sacrifice  desirable  firm  projects  to  fund  a  bargain-price 
repurchase: firms could easily find the cash both to buy their stock at a low 
price and to invest in their high-value projects. 
Consider the example above where shareholders can earn 10% on the 
cash they receive from the corporation and a 15% project is sacrificed to fund 
a $100 repurchase.  In a world of perfect capital markets, the corporation 
should be able to obtain financing for any project with a positive net present 
value.
58  Thus,  a  firm’s  ability  to  invest  in  desirable  projects  would  not 
depend on having cash on hand.  A firm could both repurchase $100 worth of 
 
56. See  Alok  Bhargava,  Executive  Compensation,  Share  Repurchases,  and  Investment 
Expenditures:  Econometric  Evidence  from  U.S.  Firms  (2010)  (unpublished  manuscript)  (on  file 
with author). 
57. See  Daniel  A.  Bens  et  al.,  Real  Investment  Implications  of  Employee  Stock  Option 
Exercises, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 359, 359 (2002) (finding evidence that firms that repurchase shares to 
satisfy option exercises exhibit subsequent poor performance because the repurchases divert cash 
from productive investments). 
58. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf,  Corporate  Financing and Investment Decisions 
when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 187 (1984). 1126  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
shares and invest $100 in the desirable project simply by borrowing another 
$100 for the project. 
However, there are a number of reasons why a firm may not borrow 
enough  money  to  fully  fund  the  desirable  project.    First,  information 
asymmetry  may  prevent  a  firm  from  borrowing  money  on  cost-effective 
terms.
59  While the firm’s executives may know that the firm’s prospects are 
good,  outside  lenders  asked  to  provide  capital  may  lack  sufficient 
information to reach the same conclusion.  Outside lenders may thus demand 
terms that make the financing of the desirable project too costly, leading 
executives to forgo the project. 
Second, even if a firm could borrow on reasonable terms from a lender, 
the borrowing may not be permitted by the firm’s existing arrangements.  For 
example,  loan  covenants  with  existing  lenders  might  bar  the  firm  from 
borrowing additional funds.  Covenants are inevitably both underinclusive 
and overinclusive: they fail to prevent some value-decreasing activities and 
unfortunately prevent some value-increasing activities.
60  In this case, a loan 
covenant preventing the firm from borrowing $100 would be overinclusive: 
it would prevent the firm from financing a desirable project with additional 
debt.
61 
Third, executives who are risk averse may wish to avoid the additional 
discipline  imposed  by  more  debt.    Even  if  credit  could  be  obtained  on 
reasonable terms and the firm’s existing arrangements would permit such a 
borrowing,  the  executives  might  personally  be  better  off  forgoing  the 
valuable project rather than having the firm take on more debt.  For any of 
these  three  reasons,  there  may  be  a  trade-off  between  a  firm’s  ability  to 
repurchase its shares and its ability to fund productive activities inside the 
firm. 
D.  Rewards for Costly Contraction 
We have seen that executives holding stock can profit from bargain-
price repurchases and that repurchases can reduce social value.  I will now 
show that executives whose payoff is tied to the stock’s future value can be 
 
59. See generally id. at 187–220. 
60. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 879 (1996) (noting that the difficulty of specifying all 
possible contingencies is likely to cause covenants to be overinclusive in some respects); Marcel 
Kahan & David Yermack,  Investment  Opportunities  and the  Design of  Debt  Securities, 14 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 136, 13840 (1998) (explaining that the potential overinclusiveness of particular 
covenants may cause the parties to avoid such covenants when their ability to renegotiate these 
covenants is diminished). 
61. In  principle,  these  covenants  preventing  a  value-increasing  investment  could  be 
renegotiated, with the resulting surplus shared between the lender and the borrower.  But such 
renegotiation  is  often  difficult  or  costly,  particularly  when  the  borrower  must  simultaneously 
renegotiate  with  multiple  creditors  to  obtain  the  modifications  needed  to  facilitate  the  new 
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rewarded for engaging in value-wasting repurchases.  I will then explain that 
other components of executives’ pay packages fail to mitigate this distortion. 
1.  Equity  Pay  and  Costly  Repurchases.—To  see  why  executives 
holding the firm’s equity can be rewarded for costly contraction, let us return 
to the example of ABC Corporation introduced in subpart B.  As before, 
ABC has two shares outstanding and is liquidated at Liquidation Date.
62  One 
share is held by its CEO.  The other share is held by public shareholders.  
Consider two scenarios: 
No-Transaction Scenario: Suppose that if ABC does not repurchase any 
of its equity prior to Liquidation Date, it will distribute $20 to the holders of 
its  two  shares  at  Liquidation  Date.    The  no-transaction  value  of  each  of 
ABC’s two shares at Liquidation Date is thus $10. 
Costly  Repurchase  Scenario:  Now  suppose  that  ABC  can  conduct  a 
repurchase before Liquidation Date when the stock trades at $8 ($2 less than 
its actual value of $10), buying back public shareholders’ single share at that 
price.    Assume  that  the  $8  spent  on  the  repurchase  reduces  ABC’s 
Liquidation Date value by $9, from $20 to $11, because ABC must give up a 
valuable project.  At Liquidation Date, the value of ABC’s remaining share 
(held by CEO) is thus $11. 
It should be easy to see that the costly bargain-price repurchase boosts 
CEO’s payout even though it reduces social value.  In the No-Transaction 
Scenario,  ABC’s  social  value is  $20;  in the  Costly  Repurchase  Scenario, 
ABC’s social value is $19.
63  But CEO’s payout in the Costly Repurchase 
Scenario is $11, $1 more than in the No-Transaction Scenario.  The effect of 
the repurchase on social value and CEO’s payoff can be summarized in the 
following table: 
 
Table 2. Rewards for Costly Repurchase 
  Social Value  CEO Payoff 
No Repurchase  $20  $10 
 Repurchase  $19  $11 
 
As one can see, an executive whose payoff is tied to the stock’s future 
value can be rewarded for repurchasing shares even when the transaction 
destroys social value.  The problem is that tying the executive’s payoff to the 
stock’s future value aligns the executive’s interests with those of nontrading 
 
62. I assume that ABC does not issue any dividends (or sell any equity) before Liquidation 
Date. 
63. In the No-Transaction Scenario, all $20 flows to shareholders at Liquidation Date.  In the 
Repurchase Scenario, $8 flows to shareholders during the repurchase and $11 flows to shareholders 
at Liquidation Date (for a total of $19).   1128  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
shareholders  but  not  with  those  of  redeeming  shareholders.    Thus,  the 
executive has an incentive to transfer value from redeeming shareholders to 
nontrading  shareholders  even  when  such  transfer  destroys  social  value.  
Importantly, this distortion arises even if the executive’s payoff is tied to the 
stock’s long-term value.    
2.  Do Other Pay Components Mitigate?—We just saw that an executive 
whose payoff is tied to the stock’s future value can be rewarded for engaging 
in a repurchase that reduces social value.  But executives are typically free to 
sell much of their equity in the short term.
64  One might think that having 
stock that could be sold in the short term would (at least partially) tie the 
executive’s payoff to that of short-term shareholders, including redeeming 
shareholders who sell stock back to the corporation when the firm conducts a 
repurchase. 
However, the fact that executives can sell stock in the short term does 
not mean that they will sell stock in the short term.  When executives know 
that the stock is underpriced and conduct a repurchase in order to indirectly 
buy stock at a low price, they can be expected to hold onto their personal 
shares until the stock price rises.  In fact, there is evidence that executives 
buy additional shares for their personal accounts before and during bargain 
repurchases.
65  Thus,  other  components  of  executives’  compensation 
arrangements  will  not  mitigate  their  incentive  to  engage  in  bargain-price 
repurchases that destroy value.
66 
III.  Equity Pay and Costly Expansion 
Part  II  demonstrated  that  an  executive  whose  payoff  is  tied  to  the 
stock’s future value can be rewarded for inefficiently contracting the firm’s 
operations when the firm’s current stock price is below its actual value.  This 
Part  shows  that  such  an  executive  can  also  be  rewarded  for  inefficiently 
expanding the firm’s operations when the firm’s current stock price is above 
its actual value.  In particular, such an executive benefits from having the 
firm sell additional equity at inflated prices, even when the assets acquired by 
the firm in such an issuance are invested in ways that reduce social value. 
Subpart A discusses the widespread use of equity issuances by firms.  
Subpart B explains that an executives whose payoff is tied to the stock’s 
future value benefit when the firms sell overpriced stock.  It also provides 
evidence that such inflated-price issuances are common.  Subpart C explains 
why equity issuances can reduce social value.  Subpart D then shows that 
 
64. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 174–79. 
65. See Raad & Wu, supra note 45, at 57 (reporting higher levels of insider stock purchases in 
the month immediately preceding a share repurchase announcement). 
66. Of course, executives whose total pay is tied to firm size may have somewhat less incentive 
to engage in a costly repurchase, or indeed any kind of repurchase.   2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1129 
 
 
 
such  an  executive  can  benefit  even  if  inflated-price  issuances  lead  to  a 
reduction in social value. 
A.  The Use of Share Issuances 
After undergoing an IPO, a publicly traded firm usually continues to 
issue shares throughout its life.
67  Such issuances typically serve one of three 
purposes.  First, stock is issued to employees as part of their compensation 
packages.
68  Second, stock issuances are used to raise cash for operations and 
strategic  investments  or  to  pay  down  debt.
69  Third,  in  the  context  of 
corporate  acquisitions,  stock  is  often  issued  to  target  shareholders  as 
consideration for their shares in the target company.
70 
Although equity issuances have different purposes, all have the same 
economic consequence: they directly or indirectly move cash or other assets 
into the firm.
71  Equity issuances thus have the opposite effect of repurchases.  
While repurchases remove value from the firm and put it into the hands of 
shareholders, equity issuances take value from shareholders and put it into 
the firm’s hands. 
B.  Using Share Issuances to Sell High 
This  subpart  explains  that  an  executive  whose  payoff  is  tied  to  the 
stock’s future value has a strong incentive to issue shares when the stock’s 
current price is higher than its actual value.  It then describes the substantial 
evidence that executives frequently engage in inflated-price issuances. 
1.  Executives’  Payoffs.—An  equity  issuance  has  analogous 
distributional effects to a share repurchase.  As we saw in Part II, a share 
repurchase  transfers  value  from  redeeming  shareholders  to  nontrading 
shareholders  when  the  stock  price  is  below  the  stock’s  actual  value.  
 
67. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Financing Decisions: Who Issues Stock?, 76 J. 
FIN. ECON. 549, 550 (2005) (reporting that 86% of publicly traded firms in their sample issued 
stock after their IPOs between 1993 and 2002). 
68. Among the largest 200 firms in 2007, the range of shares allocated to equity compensation 
plans ranged from 0.92% of outstanding shares to 62.6% of outstanding shares, with the median 
around 10.5%.  PEARL MEYER & PARTNERS, 2008 EQUITY STAKE STUDY: STUDY OF THE TOP 200 
CORPORATIONS 2 (2009). 
69. See  Fama  &  French,  supra  note  74,  at  573–74  (describing  various  purposes  for  stock 
issuances).  These cash-raising issuances may take the form of seasoned equity offerings, private 
placements, convertible debt, warrants, or rights issues.  Id. at 550. 
70. See id. at 554 (explaining the tax advantage of using acquirer-firm stock to purchase shares 
of targets). 
71. The issuance of equity for compensation indirectly moves cash into the firm.  The firm 
gives equity to executives and other employees, who eventually sell the equity for cash on the open 
market to investors.  This practice has the same economic effect as a transaction in which the 
investors buy stock from the firm for cash and the firm then uses the cash to compensate executives 
and other employees.  The issuance of stock to raise cash to pay down debt can also indirectly shift 
cash into the firm by reducing future interest payments. 1130  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
Similarly,  a  stock  issuance  transfers  value from  investing  shareholders  to 
nontrading shareholders when the stock’s price is above its actual value. 
Like a share repurchase, an equity issuance is economically equivalent 
to a two-part transaction that involves investing shareholders trading directly 
with nontrading shareholders.  In particular, a stock issuance is economically 
equivalent to (1) the firm issuing shares pro rata to nontrading and investing 
shareholders for the issuance price, and (2) nontrading shareholders selling 
their  portion  of  the  issued  shares  to  the  investing  shareholders  for  the 
issuance  price.    Thus,  an  equity  issuance  transfers  value  from  investing 
shareholders to nontrading shareholders (including executives holding stock) 
when the sale price exceeds the value of the issued stock. 
To  illustrate  the  incentive  of  executives  holding  stock  to  conduct 
inflated-price offerings, consider again ABC Corporation.  As before, it has 
two  shares  outstanding,  one  held  by  CEO  and  one  held  by  public 
shareholders,  and  it  is  liquidated  at  Liquidation  Date.
72  Consider  two 
scenarios: 
No-Transaction Scenario: Suppose that if ABC does not sell any of its 
equity prior to Liquidation Date, it will distribute $20 to the holders of its 
two shares at Liquidation Date.  The no-transaction value of each of ABC’s 
two shares at Liquidation Date is thus $10. 
Equity  Issuance  Scenario:  Now  suppose  that  ABC  can  conduct  an 
equity issuance before Liquidation Date when the stock trades at $13 ($3 
more than its actual value of $10), selling a third share at that price.  Assume 
that the $13 received by ABC increases ABC’s Liquidation Date value from 
$20 to $33.  At Liquidation Date, the value of each of ABC’s three shares 
(including that held by CEO) is thus $11. 
It should be easy to see that the inflated-price issuance boosts CEO’s 
payout  without  increasing  social  value—the  value  flowing  to  ABC’s 
shareholders over time.   In both the No-Transaction Scenario and Equity 
Issuance Scenario, ABC’s social value is $20.
73  But CEO’s payout in the 
No-Transaction Scenario is only $10, while in the Equity Issuance Scenario 
it is $11.  The results are summarized in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3. Rewards for Inflated-Price Issuance 
  Social Value  CEO Payoff 
No Equity Issuance  $20  $10 
Equity Issuance  $20  $11 
 
72. I  assume  that  ABC  does  not  issue  any  dividends  (or  repurchase  any  equity)  before 
Liquidation Date. 
73. In the No-Transaction Scenario, all $20 flows to shareholders at Liquidation Date.  In the 
Equity Issuance Scenario, $13 flows from shareholders during the equity issuance, and $33 flows 
back to shareholders at Liquidation Date (for a net amount of $20).   2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1131 
 
 
 
2.  Evidence  of  Inflated-Price  Issuances.—There  is  considerable 
evidence  that  firms  tend  to  conduct  seasoned  equity  offerings  (SEOs)—
transactions in which cash is raised from new and existing shareholders—
when the stock is overpriced.
74  For example, one well-known study found 
that firms undertaking SEOs systematically underperform benchmark stocks 
over the five-year post-offering period.
75  This pattern of underperformance 
indicates that the shares sold were, on average, overpriced at the time of the 
SEO.
76 
When a firm’s shares are overpriced, the firm is also more likely to 
acquire other companies and use its shares as consideration in the merger.
77  
There is evidence that such acquisitions boost the long-term stock value of 
the acquiring firms’ shares by enabling the acquiring firms to purchase assets 
cheaply.
78  To  the  extent  executives  of  these  firms  hold  equity  that  they 
 
74. See, e.g., Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23, 25, 47 (1995) 
(examining 3702 seasoned equity offerings between 1970 and 1980 and finding evidence consistent 
with firms announcing stock issues when the stock is grossly overvalued, the market failing to 
revalue the stock appropriately, and the stock remaining overvalued when the issue occurs). 
75. See  Loughran  &  Ritter,  supra  note  74,  at  23–25  (examining  SEO  underperformance 
between  1970  and  1990);  see  also  Jeffrey  Pontiff  &  Artemiza  Woodgate,  Share  Issuance  and 
Cross-sectional  Returns,  63  J.  FIN.  921,  943–44  (2008)  (finding  evidence  of  post-SEO  stock 
underperformance in a more recent sample of U.S. SEOs).  For evidence that SEOs are used in other 
countries to sell stock at an inflated price, see Brian J. Henderson et al., World Markets for Raising 
New Capital, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 66 (2006) (concluding that “firms are more likely to issue equity 
when the stock market appears to be overvalued”). 
76. The  failure  of  investors  to  immediately  impart  all  of the  information  signaled  by  these 
transactions into the stock price is another example of the investor underreaction discussed earlier.  
See, e.g., Loughran & Ritter, supra note 74, at 47–48 (discussing the market’s “misvaluation” of 
SEOs). 
77. See, e.g., Ming Dong et al., Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market?, 61 J. 
FIN. 725, 757 (2006) (finding that overpriced firms are more likely to try to acquire other firms that 
are  less  overpriced);  Matthew  Rhodes-Kropf  et  al.,  Valuation Waves  and  Merger  Activity:  The 
Empirical Evidence, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 561, 600–01 (2005) (concluding that the “vast majority” of 
mergers  involve  “highly  overvalued  bidders”);  Itzhak  Ben-David  et  al.,  Are  Stock  Acquirers 
Overvalued?   Evidence  from  Short  Selling  Activity  23–24 (Fisher Coll. of Bus. Working Paper 
Series,  Working  Paper  No.  2010-03-011,  2010),  available  at  http://www.ssrn.com/abstract= 
1572686 (determining that short-selling activity is consistent with acquirers using overvalued stock 
to  buy  other  companies);  cf.  Matthew  Rhodes-Kropf  &  S. Viswanathan,  Market  Valuation  and 
Merger Waves, 59 J. FIN. 2685, 2710 (2004) (presenting a model in which acquirers are more likely 
to use stock when they are overvalued); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven 
Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295, 300 (2003) (proposing that overvalued firms engage in stock-
financed acquisitions so that the overvalued firms’ shareholders can benefit from obtaining hard 
assets at a discount). 
78. See Pavel G. Savor & Qi Lu, Do Stock Mergers Create Value for Acquirers?, 64 J. FIN. 
1061, 1063 (2009) (finding that the shares of a sample of stock-financed bidders that completed 
their acquisitions outperformed a control sample of stock-financed bidders that failed to complete 
their acquisitions by 25–30% over a three-year horizon, and demonstrating that the outperformance 
was due to the successful bidders ability to acquire cheap assets); cf. Tim Loughran & Anand M. 
Vijh,  Do  Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from  Corporate Acquisitions?, 52 J. FIN. 1765, 1775 
(1997) (finding that managers of acquiring firms use stock to pay for the acquisitions when their 
firms’ stock is likely to be overvalued and cash when their firms’ stock is likely to be undervalued). 1132  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
cannot currently cash out, they will benefit from using overpriced stock to 
acquire target assets at a discount.
79 
Recall from Part II that there is evidence that executives manipulate the 
stock  price  down  around  stock  buybacks  to  increase  their  profits  from 
bargain-price repurchases.  Similarly, executives manipulate the stock price 
up around equity offerings in order to increase the amount transferred from 
investors buying stock from the firm.  One study found that seasoned equity 
issuers are more likely to manipulate earnings than nonissuers and that such 
manipulations boost the price around the equity offering.
80  Such earnings 
manipulations also occur when the stock is being used to acquire another 
company.
81 
C.   The Possibility of Costly Expansion 
As we have seen, an executive whose payoff is tied to the stock’s future 
value  are  rewarded  for  conducting  inflated-price  issuances,  and  there  is 
considerable evidence that such issuances are common.  This subpart shows 
that equity issuances can reduce social value by diverting money or other 
assets into firm investments that yield lower returns than investments outside 
of the firm. 
1.  Why  Expansion  Can  Reduce  Social  Value.—Just  as  a  share 
repurchase  can  reduce  social  value  by  distributing  cash  that  should  be 
invested in the firm’s own projects, an equity issuance can reduce  social 
value by enabling the firm to engage in projects that yield a lower return than 
projects outside of the firm.  Suppose, for example, that the $100 raised by an 
equity issuance would generate a return of 10% outside of the firm.  Suppose 
 
79. To  the  extent  the  stock  is  overpriced  and  insiders  can  cash  out  some  of  their  equity 
immediately, they will have an incentive to unwind this equity even as they seek to boost the value 
of their remaining shares by having the firm issue overpriced stock.  See Daniel Bradley et al., Do 
Insiders Practice What They Preach?  Informed Option Exercises Around Acquisitions 4–5 (Feb. 
2009)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available  at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1364787  (finding  that,  around  the  announcement  of  stock-financed  acquisitions,  insiders  of  the 
acquiring firm exercise stock options and sell the underlying shares). 
80. See Siew Hong Teoh et al., Earnings Management and the Underperformance of Seasoned 
Equity Offerings, 50 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 64–65 (1998) (reporting that seasoned equity issuers raise 
reported earnings by altering discretionary accruals and that this manipulation lowers post-offering 
returns);  cf.  Daniel A.  Cohen  &  Paul  Zarowin,  Accrual-Based  and  Real  Earnings  Management 
Activities Around Seasoned Equity Offerings 4, 10 (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=108193  (finding  use  of  both  accrual-based  and  real  earnings 
management in a sample of 1,511 SEOs between 1987 and 2006). 
81. See, e.g., Merle Erickson & Shiing-wu Wang, Earnings Management by Acquiring Firms in 
Stock for Stock Mergers, 27 J. ACCT. & ECON. 149, 151 (1999) (finding, in a sample of stock-
financed  mergers  between  1985  and  1990,  that  acquirers  managed  earnings  upward  before 
announcing the  merger); Henock Louis,  Earnings  Management and  the  Market  Performance of 
Acquiring Firms, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 121, 134, 136 tbl.4 (2004) (finding that acquiring firms overstate 
earnings prior to stock-for-stock acquisitions). 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1133 
 
 
 
further that, if invested in the firm, the $100 would generate returns of 5%.  
The $100 equity issuance would thus destroy $5 of social value. 
Substantial  evidence  suggests  that  expansions  facilitated  by  equity 
issuances  can  reduce  social  value.    For  example,  acquisitions—many  of 
which  are  financed  by  the  acquirer  issuing  stock—frequently  reduce  the 
aggregate wealth of both acquirer and target shareholders.
82  One study found 
that during the period from 1998 to 2001, the combined value of acquirer and 
target stock fell over $100 billion following acquisition announcements.
83 
It is well-known that much of this value destruction occurs when firms 
have overpriced stock to pay for their acquisitions.
84  One oft-cited example 
of a value-destroying acquisition financed by overpriced equity is America 
Online’s (AOL) acquisition of Time Warner in 2000.
85  AOL, with a market 
capitalization of over $200 billion, used $162 billion of its own stock to 
acquire Time Warner.
86  Whatever or not AOL’s executives expected the 
merger  to  generate  synergy  benefits,  it  failed  to  do  so.    Because  the 
companies were worth more separated than together, AOL and Time Warner 
parted ways nine years later.
87  When AOL was spun off, it was worth $3.5 
billion while Time Warner was valued at about $36 billion.
88 
Although  the  merger  was  a  bust,  AOL’s  original  shareholders  could 
have benefitted substantially from the transaction.  Had AOL not acquired 
Time Warner, AOL shareholders would have seen the value of their shares 
decline from approximately $200 billion to several billion dollars over the 
next decade.  Instead, AOL shareholders ended up owning a large fraction of 
Time Warner, which ten years later had a market capitalization more than ten 
times that of AOL.  Thus, acquisitions using high-priced stock can boost the 
 
82. See Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale?  A Study of Acquiring-
Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 759 (2005) (finding that decreases in 
acquirer shareholder value were not due to wealth transfers from acquiring shareholders to target 
shareholders because the combined value of the acquirer and the target decreased significantly). 
83. Id.  To the extent that some of the decrease in the acquirer stock price following acquisition 
announcements is due to the offer signaling that the acquirer is overpriced, not all of this loss in 
shareholder value necessarily represents a destruction of social value. 
84. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 10 (2005) 
(arguing that managers of firms with overpriced stock make poor acquisitions in part to buy assets 
cheaply). 
85. See Tim Arango, How the AOL–Time Warner Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/business/media/11merger.html?_r=1 (reporting that the 
2000 deal valued the combined firm at $350 billion and that ten years later the combined values of 
the companies, which have since been separated, was about one-seventh of their combined values 
on the day of the merger). 
86. See Daniel Okrent, Happily Ever After?, TIME, Jan. 24, 2000, at 39, 39 (reporting that the 
transaction was an all-stock acquisition for about $162 billion of AOL stock). 
87. See W. David Garnder, AOL Completes Spin-Off From Time Warner, INFORMATION WEEK 
(Dec.  10,  2009),  http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/ebusiness/showArticle.jhtml? 
articleID=222001597. 
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long-term value of the acquiring firm’s shares even if the acquisitions end up 
destroying social value. 
2.  Why  Not  Sell  Overpriced  Shares  and  Distribute  the  Cash  to 
Shareholders?—A  firm  that  sells  inflated-price  equity  could,  in  principle, 
simply distribute the sale proceeds to its shareholders rather than invest the 
proceeds in unproductive activities.  Indeed, the firm’s current shareholders 
and its executives would be much better off if the cash raised by an inflated-
price  offering  could  be  used  to  generate  high  returns  outside  of the firm 
rather than low returns inside the firm. 
Why then would executives ever use the cash raised from an inflated-
price offering to make unproductive investments in the firm?  The reason is 
simple: a firm selling equity must inform its old and new investors of the 
purpose of the financing.
89  If the firm announces that it will take all of the 
funds  raised  and  hold  them  in  cash  or  distribute  them  to  shareholders, 
investors are likely to infer that the firm is issuing stock merely to exploit the 
overpricing  of  its  stock.
90  Investors  may  thus  refuse  to  purchase  shares, 
preventing the firm from selling overpriced equity. 
Because  firms  selling  equity  cannot  simply  distribute  the  cash  to 
investors, firms generally must use the funds for some other purpose, such as 
increasing investment.
91  Thus, if the firm has poor investment opportunities, 
the only way to sell overpriced stock may be to use the proceeds for value-
wasting  investments.    Unfortunately,  as  we  will  see  shortly,  executives 
holding  stock  in  their  firms  can  be  rewarded  for  such  value-wasting 
investments. 
D.  Rewards for Costly Expansion 
Having seen that equity issuances can reduce social value, we will now 
see that an executive whose payoff is tied to the stock’s future value can be 
rewarded by engaging in inflated-price equity issuances that reduce social 
value.  I will then explain that other components of executives’ pay packages 
do not mitigate this distortion. 
 
89. See, e.g., SEC, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, at 10 (Form S-3), 
available  at  www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-3.pdf  (requiring  a  stock  issuer  to  furnish  the 
information required   by   Item  504   of   Regulation   S-K, namely the “principal purposes for the 
which the proceeds are to be used”). 
90. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
237, 262 & n.65 (2009) (observing that the distribution of proceeds from a new equity sale would 
signal that the issuer sold the shares simply because it believed the stock was overpriced). 
91. See  Woojin  Kim  &  Michael  S.  Weisbach,  Motivations  for  Public  Equity  Offers:  An 
International Perspective, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 281, 283 (2008) (reporting that equity offerings are done 
both to raise investment capital and to exploit favorable market conditions); Ming Dong et al., Stock 
Market  Misvaluation  and  Corporate Investment 4 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 
3109,  2007),  available  at  http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3109  (finding  that  cash  raised  by 
overpriced firms issuing equity is used to increase investment). 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1135 
 
 
 
1.  Equity  Pay  and  Costly  Expansion.—Executives whose payoffs are 
tied to the stock’s future value can be rewarded for engaging in inflated-price 
equity issuances, even if those issuances reduce social value. 
Return  again  to  ABC  Corporation.    As  before,  it  has  two  shares 
outstanding, one held by CEO and one held by public shareholders, and is 
liquidated at Liquidation Date.
92  Consider two scenarios: 
No-Transaction Scenario: Suppose that if ABC does not sell any of its 
equity prior to Liquidation Date, it will distribute $20 to the holders of its 
two shares at Liquidation Date.  The no-transaction value of each of ABC’s 
two shares at Liquidation Date is thus $10. 
Equity  Issuance  Scenario:  Now  suppose  that  ABC  can  conduct  an 
equity issuance before Liquidation Date when the stock trades at $14 ($4 
more than its actual value of $10), selling a third share at that price.  Assume 
that the $14 received by ABC increases ABC’s Liquidation Date value from 
$20 to $33 because $1 of social value is destroyed by the transaction.  At 
Liquidation Date, the value of each of ABC’s three shares (including that 
held by CEO) is thus $11. 
It should be easy to see that the inflated-price issuance boosts CEO’s 
payout while reducing social value.  In the No-Transaction Scenario, ABC’s 
social  value  is  $20.    In  the  Equity  Issuance  Scenario,  it  is  $19  ($33 
distributed  to  shareholders  at  Liquidation  Date  less  the  $14  raised  from 
investors).
93  But CEO’s payout in the Equity Issuance Scenario is $1 higher 
($11 rather than $10).  The net effect of the inflated-price equity sale on 
social value and CEO’s payoff can be summarized in Table 4 below: 
 
Table 4. Rewards for Costly Expansion 
  Social Value  CEO Payoff 
No Equity Issuance  $20  $10 
Equity Issuance  $19  $11 
 
As one can see, the inflated-price equity issuance rewards CEO even 
though  social  value  is  reduced.    Thus,  the  equity  given  to  CEO  can 
incentivize her to direct the firm to sell shares even when the transaction 
destroys social value. 
The problem is that tying an executive’s payoff to the stock’s future 
value aligns the executive’s interests with those of nontrading shareholders 
but not with those of investing shareholders who buy additional stock from 
 
92. I  assume  that  ABC  does  not  issue  any  dividends  (or  repurchase  any  equity)  before 
Liquidation Date. 
93. In the No-Transaction Scenario, all $20 flows to shareholders at Liquidation Date.  In the 
Equity Issuance Scenario, $14 flows from shareholders during the equity issuance and $33 flows 
back to shareholders at Liquidation Date (for a net amount of $19).   1136  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
the firm.  Thus, the executive has an incentive to take steps that transfer 
value  from  investing  shareholders  to  nontrading  shareholders  even  when 
such  steps  would  destroy  social  value.  And,  as  in  the  case  of  costly 
repurchases, this distortion arises even if the executive’s payoff is tied to the 
stock’s long-term value. 
2.  Do  Other  Pay  Components  Mitigate?—As  we  have  seen,  an 
executive whose payoff is tied to the stock’s future value can be rewarded for 
engaging in  value-wasting equity issuances when the stock is overpriced.  
However, equity comprises only part of an executive’s compensation.  The 
executive  likely  also  receives  a  cash  salary  and  bonus.    In  addition,  the 
executive  may  hold  stock  that she  can  unload  currently.    Do  these  other 
forms of compensation mitigate the adverse incentives created by the equity 
held by the executive? 
Unfortunately, none of these other components of the executive’s pay 
package  undermines  executives’  incentive  to  engage  in  costly  expansion 
when  the  stock  is  overpriced.    Indeed,  given  the  well-known  correlation 
between market capitalization and executive pay, salary and other forms of 
compensation may well rise if the executive expands the firm.
94   
What about any equity that the executive is free to unwind currently?  
The executive will have an incentive to sell the unwindable stock and still 
conduct an overpriced equity issuance to boost the value of her remaining 
shares.  In fact, there is evidence that executives whose firms are selling 
overpriced stock simultaneously unload some of their own shares.
95  In short, 
the  incentive  to  engage  in  costly  expansion  is  not  weakened  by  other 
components of executives’ pay packages. 
IV.  The Constant-Share Approach 
Parts II and III demonstrated that executives whose payoffs are tied to 
the future value of their firms’ shares can be rewarded for engaging in both 
stock  repurchases  and  equity  issuances  that  reduce  aggregate  shareholder 
value—the amount of value flowing to all of the firm’s shareholders over 
time.  The problem is that the stock’s future value does not reflect the value 
flowing to redeeming shareholders—those investors who sell shares back to 
the  corporation—or  the  value  flowing  to  investing  shareholders—those 
investors  who  buy  shares  from  the  firm.  Rather,  the  stock’s  future  value 
reflects only the value flowing to one subset of shareholders—nontrading 
shareholders—investors who neither sell any of their stock to the firm nor 
buy any additional stock from the firm before that future date. 
 
94. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, Firm Expansion and CEO Pay 2–3 (Harvard John M. 
Olin  Discussion  Paper  Series,  Discussion  Paper  No.  533,  2007),  available  at  http://papers.ssrn. 
com/abstract_id=838245. 
95. See supra note 88. 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1137 
 
 
 
In this Part, I explain how equity pay could be structured to reward 
executives  for  repurchases  and  equity  issuances  if  and  only  if  these 
transactions increase aggregate shareholder value.  Subpart A puts forward 
and provides an overview of a “constant-share” approach to equity-based pay 
that would tie executives’ payoffs to aggregate shareholder value—the value 
flowing to nontrading, redeeming, and investing shareholders in aggregate—
and  thereby  eliminate  executives’  incentives  to  engage  in  value-reducing 
repurchases and equity issuances merely to boost the stock’s future value.  
Subpart B describes in more detail how the constant-share approach operates 
in  the  context  of  a  repurchase.    Subpart  C  describes  how  the  approach 
operates in connection with an equity issuance.  
My main goal in this Part is to explain the concept behind the constant-
share  approach  rather  than  put  forward  a  fully  fleshed-out  proposal  for 
implementing it.  Thus, in explaining the conceptual underpinnings of the 
constant-share  approach,  I  make  some  simplifying  assumptions.  In 
particular, I assume an executive subject to the constant-share approach owns 
vested stock subject to a holding requirement (and no other equity in the 
firm), is risk-neutral, has sufficient liquidity to purchase additional shares, 
and cannot use hedging or other techniques to circumvent the constant-share 
arrangement.
  I also ignore tax considerations and the time value of money.  
A mathematical model of the constant-share approach can be found in the 
Appendix. 
A.  Description of the Approach 
Under  the  constant-share  approach,  executives  would  be  required  to 
adjust their equity positions whenever the firm repurchases or issues shares 
such  that  executives’  fractional  ownership  in  the  firm  remains  constant 
throughout  the  transaction.    Thus,  when  the  firm  repurchases  shares,  an 
executive would be required to sell some of her shares to the firm.  And 
when  the  firm  issues  shares,  the  executive  would  be  required  to  buy 
additional shares.   
Whether  the  firm  buys  or  sells  it  own  stock,  the  executive  would 
transact with the firm on the same terms as the firm transacts with other 
investors.  Thus, when the firm repurchases shares, the executive must sell 
shares to the firm at the repurchase price.  Similarly, the executive must buy 
shares at the issue price when the firm sells shares. 
For example, suppose than an executive (CEO) holds a certain fraction 
of  the  firm’s  equity  at  a  particular  point  in  time  (say  2%).    If  the  firm 
repurchases 10% of its shares, CEO would be required to sell to the firm, at 
the same price the firm pays for the repurchased shares, 10% of  her 2% 
block,  or  0.2%  of  the  firm’s  shares.    Similarly,  if  the  firm  increases  its 
outstanding shares by 10% in an equity offering, CEO would be required to 
buy,  at  the  same  price  the  firm  receives  for  the  newly  issued  stock,  an 
amount equal to 10% of her 2% block, or 0.2% of the firm’s outstanding 1138  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
shares.  The effect of CEO’s transactions would be to leave CEO with the 
same fraction of the firm’s outstanding shares after the repurchase or share 
issuance as before—in this case, 2%.
96 
As I explain in more detail below, requiring an executive to participate 
in  repurchases  as  a  redeeming  shareholder  and  in  equity  issuances  as  an 
investing  shareholder  in  the  same  proportion  as  she  owns  stock  in  the 
company  ensures  that  the  executive’s  equity  payoff  is  tied  to  the  value 
flowing  to  all  of  the  firm’s  shareholders,  not  just  the  value  flowing  to 
nontrading  shareholders.    Essentially,  the  constant-share  approach  would 
make  the  executive  both  a  nontrading  and  redeeming  shareholder  in  a 
repurchase  and  both  a  nontrading  and  investing  shareholder  in  an  equity 
issuance.    Thus,  the  executive  no  longer  financially  benefits  from 
repurchases and stock issuances that merely transfer wealth from one set of 
shareholders to another without generating any social value.  Instead, the 
executive has an incentive to engage in repurchases and equity issuances if 
and only if they increase aggregate shareholder value. 
The  constant-share  approach  provides  another  benefit  in  addition  to 
eliminating  the  incentive  to  engage  in  costly  contractions  and  costly 
expansions.  As Parts II and III explained, executives frequently manipulate 
the stock price around repurchases and equity issuances to further boost the 
value of their equity.  Once executives have decided to conduct a repurchase, 
driving down the stock price before the repurchase increases the value of 
executives’ equity to the extent they are indirect buyers of the repurchased 
stock.  Similarly, given that an equity issuance will occur, driving up the 
stock price increases the value of executives’ equity to the extent they are 
indirect  sellers  of  the  issued  equity.    The  constant-share  approach  thus 
eliminates  executives’  equity-driven  incentive  to  engage  in  such 
manipulations  by  ensuring  that  executives  are  neither  indirect  buyers  nor 
indirect sellers in these transactions. 
B.  Constant-Share Approach in a Repurchasing Firm 
When a firm repurchases shares, the constant-share approach ties an 
executive’s  equity  payoff  to  the  total  amount  of  value  flowing  to  both 
 
96. Although I assume in the text that CEO sells and purchases shares whenever the firm 
transacts in its own stock, CEO’s adjustments could be effected through the use of derivatives rather 
than the purchase or sale of actual shares.  For example, if the firm issues 1,000,000 new shares, 
CEO could be required to swap, on the date her holding requirements terminate, (1) the value of 
20,000 shares at the issuance price plus interest for (2) the value of 20,0000 shares on that date.  
Such a mechanism would avoid the need for the CEO to pay cash for additional shares. 
Moreover, the adjustments required by the constant-share approach need not be made every time 
the firm transacts in its own stock.  Rather, the firm could track its repurchases and equity offerings 
each year (and CEO’s positions on the eve of each of these transactions) and, at year-end, require 
CEO to engage in a single transaction with the firm that leaves CEO in the same position as if 
contemporaneous adjustments had been made. The Appendix explains how an ex post adjustment 
could be effected.   
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nontrading and redeeming shareholders.  Thus, this mechanism eliminates 
the  executive’s  incentive  to  engage  in  a  repurchase  merely  because  it 
transfers  value  from  redeeming  shareholders.    Instead,  the  executive  is 
rewarded for engaging in a repurchase if and only if the repurchase increases 
aggregate shareholder value. 
To see why this is the case, suppose that an executive (CEO), at the time 
of a possible repurchase, owns 10% of the firm’s stock.  Suppose that the 
firm is considering purchasing 20% of the outstanding shares at the current 
trading price. 
Absent the constant-share mechanism, CEO would own 12.5% of the 
firm’s shares after the repurchase.
97  Thus, CEO would receive 12.5% of the 
value  flowing  to  nontrading  shareholders—the  shareholders  who  do  not 
redeem  their  shares  in  the  repurchase—and  0%  of  the  value  flowing  to 
redeeming shareholders.  CEO’s equity payoff would thus reflect only the 
value  flowing  to  nontrading  shareholders  rather  than  to  all  of  the  firm’s 
shareholders affected by the transaction.  As we saw in Part II, CEO may 
well  be  rewarded  for  engaging  in  a  bargain-price  repurchase  even  if  it 
reduces aggregate shareholder value. 
Under  the  constant-share  approach,  CEO  would  be  required  to 
participate in the 20% repurchase in an amount proportionate to her pre-
transaction ownership interest of the firm (10%).  Thus, shares sold by CEO 
to the firm would constitute 10% of the 20% block acquired by the firm (or 
2% of the firm’s outstanding stock).  Put another way, because the firm is 
repurchasing 20% of all of its shares, CEO would be required to sell to the 
firm 20% of her 10% interest. 
After the repurchase, CEO would continue to own 10% of the firm’s 
equity.  Thus, CEO would receive 10% of the value flowing to nontrading 
shareholders.  But because CEO also held 10% of the equity repurchased by 
the  firm,  CEO  would  receive  10%  of  the  value  flowing  to  redeeming 
shareholders.    As  a  result,  CEO’s  payoff  would  equal  10%  of  the  value 
flowing to all of the firm’s shareholders affected by the transaction.  Thus, 
CEO would have an incentive to conduct the repurchase if and only if the 
repurchase increases aggregate shareholder value. 
C.  Constant-Share Approach in a Share-Issuing Firm 
I now turn to consider how the constant-share approach operates when a 
firm  issues  equity.    As  I  will  show,  the  constant-share  approach  ties  an 
executive’s payoff to the total amount of value flowing to both nontrading 
and investing shareholders.  Thus, the mechanism eliminates the executive’s 
incentive  to  engage  in  an  equity  issuance  merely  because  the  issuance 
 
97. Because  the  firm  is  repurchasing  20%  of  its  stock,  the  proportional  interest  of  each 
remaining shareholder, including CEO, will increase by 25%. 1140  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
transfers value from investing shareholders.  Instead, the executive will be 
rewarded  for  engaging  in  any  equity  issuance  if  and  only  if  it  increases 
aggregate shareholder value. 
To see why this is the case, suppose that an executive (CEO), at the time 
of a possible equity issuance, owns 10% of the firm’s stock.  Suppose that 
the  firm  is  considering  issuing  an  amount  of  stock  equal  to  25%  of  the 
outstanding shares at the current trading price. 
Absent a constant-share mechanism, CEO would own 8% of the firm’s 
stock  after the transaction.
98  Thus,  CEO  would  receive  8%  of the  value 
flowing to nontrading shareholders—the shareholders who do not invest in 
the equity issuance—and 0% of the value flowing to investing shareholders.  
CEO’s  equity  payoff  would  thus  reflect  the  value  flowing  to  nontrading 
shareholders  rather  than  to  all  of  the  firm’s  shareholders  affected  by  the 
transaction.  As we saw in Part III, CEO may well be rewarded for engaging 
in an inflated-price issuance even if it reduces aggregate shareholder value. 
Under the constant-share approach, CEO would be required to buy 10% 
of the shares sold by the firm.  Because the firm is selling an amount of 
shares  equal  to  25%  of  its  pre-sale  outstanding  equity,  CEO  would  be 
required to buy 2.5% of the firm’s pre-sale equity in the equity issuance.  
That is, CEO would be required to increase her share ownership by 25%, the 
proportion  by  which  the  equity  offering  increases  the  firm’s  outstanding 
shares. 
After  the  equity  issuance,  CEO  would  continue  to  own  10%  of  the 
firm’s  equity.    Thus,  CEO  would  receive  10%  of  the  value  flowing  to 
nontrading shareholders.  But because CEO also buys 10% of the equity 
issued  by  the  firm,  CEO  receives  10%  of  the  value  flowing  to  investing 
shareholders.  As a result, CEO’s payoff equals 10% of the value flowing to 
all of the firm’s shareholders affected by the transaction.  Thus, CEO would 
have an incentive to conduct the equity issuance if and only if the issuance 
increases aggregate shareholder value.
99 
V.  Conclusion   
  Tying  executive  pay  to  the  future  value  of  a  firm’s  stock  is  widely 
viewed as a useful means of incentivizing executives to generate value for  
shareholders.  This Article has identified a potential cost to public investors 
of tying executive pay to the future value of a firm’ stock, even the long-term 
value.    In  particular,  tying  executive  pay  to  the  stock’s  future  value  can 
 
98. Because  the  firm  is  issuing  an  amount  of  equity  equal  to  25%  of  its  pre-transaction 
outstanding shares, the proportional interest of each remaining shareholder, including CEO, will 
drop by 20%. 
99. I am assuming that CEO is risk-neutral.  If CEO were risk-averse, she may be deterred from 
engaging in a value-increasing equity-financed expansion if she is required to buy enough equity to 
maintain her proportional ownership of the firm.  It might thus be desirable to reduce the purchase 
requirement for a risk-averse executive. 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1141 
 
 
 
reward executives for engaging in share repurchases and equity issuances 
that reduce “aggregate shareholder value”—the amount of value flowing to 
all of a firm’s shareholders over time. 
  The Article has also put forward a new “constant-share” approach to 
equity-based compensation that ties executives’ equity payoffs to aggregate 
shareholder value.  Under this approach, an executive would be required to 
sell  some  of  her  shares  (or  buy  additional  shares)  whenever  the  firm 
repurchases  its  own  stock  (or  issues  new  equity)  so  that  the  executive’s 
proportional ownership in the firm remains constant as the firm transacts in 
its own stock.  The Article showed that the constant-share approach would 
eliminate executives’ incentives to engage in share repurchases and equity 
issuances that reduce aggregate shareholder value.   
  I  hope  that  the  analysis  I  have  offered  here  will  help  sharpen 
understanding of the potentially negative effects of tying executive pay to the 
future  value  of  a  firm’s  stock—even  its  long-term  value—and  assist 
regulators, directors, and shareholders in improving executive compensation 
and corporate governance in public companies. 1142  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
APPENDIX 
 
The  Appendix  provides  an  analytical  framework  for  examining  the 
effect of equity compensation and the constant-share approach on executives’ 
incentives to engage in repurchases and equity issuances. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
Consider  a  Corporation  (ABC)  that  initially  has  a  single  share 
outstanding and exists in three sequential periods: Time T=0, Time T=1, and 
Time T=2. 
 
  At T=0, ABC has a single risk-neutral manager (CEO) who is granted a 
fraction π of ABC’s equity that she must hold until T=2.  In analyzing 
CEO’s incentives, I assume CEO seeks solely to maximize the value of 
her equity. 
 
  At T=1, ABC’s equity trades for a price P1 per share and ABC may or 
may not repurchase or issue an additional amount of equity equal to a 
fraction  of its single share. 
 
  At T=2, ABC is liquidated and its value is distributed pro rata to its 
shareholders. 
 
ABC’s T=2 value will depend on whether there has been a transaction 
in ABC’s stock at T=1.  In the absence of any transactions in the firm’s stock 
(such as a repurchase or sale of equity), ABC’s T=2 value is V. 
 
If there is a repurchase (or sale) of equity, ABC’s T=2 value will be 
reduced (increased) by the amount paid (received) for any stock repurchased 
(sold) at T=1 plus an amount X representing the efficiency effects of the 
transaction on ABC’s value.  From an economic perspective, ABC should 
repurchase equity or issue equity if and only if (iff) X > 0. 
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Figure 1. Sequence of Events for ABC Corporation 
 
 
 
Social Value and Final-Period Stock Value.  Social value (SV) is the net 
amount of value flowing from ABC to its shareholders between T=0 and 
T=2.    The  final-period  stock  value  is  ABC’s  T=2  value,  divided  by  the 
number of shares outstanding at T=2. 
 
No-Transaction  Scenario.   Denote  SVn  as  ABC’s  social  value  when 
ABC neither repurchases nor issues equity at T=1.  Because the only value 
flowing to shareholders is ABC’s T=2 value V,  
 
(1a) SVn = V. 
 
Denote P2n as the final-period stock value if there is no repurchase or 
equity  issuance.    Because  ABC’s  T=2  value is V and  there is one  share 
outstanding at T=2,  
 
(2a) P2n = V. 
 
Repurchase Scenario.  Denote SVr as ABC’s social value when ABC 
repurchases  share at T=1 for a price  P1,  where the repurchase changes 
ABC’s T=2 value by X.  Because ABC distributes P1 to shareholders at 
T=1 and (V − P1 + X) at T=2, 
 
(1b) SVr = P1 + (V − P1 + X) = V + X. 
 
Denote  P2r  as  the  final-period  stock  value  if  there  is  a  repurchase. 
Because ABC’s T=2 value is  (V − P1  + X) and there is (1 − ) share 
outstanding at T=2,  
      Sequence of  
    Events for ABC 
      Corporation: 
      Time T0 to T2 
     T0: 
     CEO granted π  
        share  
 
      T1:  
    Stock trades at $P1   
    ABC may buy or sell 
             share 
  T2: 
  Value distributed 1144  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 89:1113 
 
 
(2b) P2r = (V − P1 + X)/(1 − ). 
 
Equity-Issuance  Scenario.    Denote  SVi  as  ABC’s  social  value  when 
ABC issues  share at T=1 for a price P1, where the issuance changes ABC’s 
T=2 value by X. Because ABC takes in P1 from shareholders at T=1 and  
distributes (V + P1 + X) at T=2, 
 
(1c) SVi = (V + P1 + X) − P1 = (V + X). 
 
Denote P2i as the final-period stock value if there is an equity issuance. 
Because ABC’s T=2 value is  (V + P1  + X) and there is (1 + ) share 
outstanding at T=2, 
 
(2c) P2i = (V + P1 + X)/(1 + ). 
 
SV and the final-period stock value for each scenario are summarized in 
the table below. 
 
Table 5. Social Value and Stock Value 
  Social Value  Stock Value 
No transaction  V  V 
Repurchase  V+X  (V-P1+X)/(1-) 
Equity issuance  V+X  (V+P1+X)/(1+) 
 
CEO’s Incentive to Engage in Costly Contraction 
 
Consider CEO’s incentive to repurchase at T=1 when her payoff is tied 
to the T=2 stock value.  Given CEO’s incentive to maximize the T=2 stock 
value, it follows from (2a) and (2b) that CEO will repurchase at T=1 iff 
 
(3) (V − P1 + X)/(1 − ) > V. 
 
Simplifying (3) yields 
 
(4) V − P1 > −X/. 
 
It follows from (4) that CEO has an incentive to engage in a costly 
(value-reducing) repurchase when 
 
(5) 0 > X > (P1 − V). 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1145 
 
 
 
 
Remark: If P1 ≥ V (the stock is either properly priced or overpriced at 
T=1),  CEO  does  not  have  an  incentive  to  conduct  a  costly  repurchase.  
However, if P1 < V (the stock is underpriced at T=1), CEO may have an 
interest in conducting a costly repurchase. 
 
CEO’s Incentive to Engage in Costly Expansion 
 
Now consider CEO’s incentive to issue equity at T=1 when her payoff 
is tied to the T=2 stock value.  Given CEO’s incentive to maximize the T=2 
stock value, it follows from (2a) and (2c) that CEO will issue equity at T=1 
iff 
 
(6) (V + P1 + X)/(1 + ) > V. 
 
Simplifying (6) yields 
 
(7) P1 − V > −X/. 
 
It follows from (7) that CEO has an incentive to engage in a costly 
(value-wasting) equity issuance when 
 
(8) 0 > X > (V − P1). 
 
Remark: If P1 ≤ V (the stock is either properly priced or underpriced at 
T=1),  CEO  does  not  have  an  incentive  to  engage  in  costly  expansion.  
However, if P1 > V (the stock is overpriced at T=1), CEO may benefit from 
engaging in costly expansion. 
 
Constant-Share Approach  
 
 Under  the  constant-share  approach,  CEO  must  participate  in  a 
repurchase (issuance) by selling (buying) a fraction of the shares purchased 
(sold)  by  the  company  equal  to  her  pre-transaction percentage  interest  in 
ABC, π.   
 
Denote CEO’s T=2 payoff if there is no repurchase as Wn, if there is a 
repurchase as Wr, and if there is a stock issuance as Wi. 
 
If there is no repurchase or equity issuance, the T=2 stock value is V 
CEO owns π share. It follows that  
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(9a) Wn = πV. 
 
If there is a repurchase of α share at T=1 for price P1, CEO will be 
required to sell πα share at price P1 to ABC.  CEO thus receives παP1 at T=1 
and is left with π(1 − α) share at T=2.  It follows from this and (2a) that 
 
(9b) Wr = παP1 + π(1 − α)(V − αP1 + X)/(1 − α) = π(V + X). 
 
If  there  is  an  issuance  of  equity  at  T=1,  CEO  will  pay  παP1  for 
additional equity and own π(1 + α) share at T=2.  It follows from this and 
(2c) that 
 
(9c) Wi = −παP1 + π(1 + α)(V + αP1 + X)/(1 + α) = π(V + X). 
 
CEO’s payoff under each scenario can be summarized in the following 
table. 
 
Table  6:  Social  Value  and  CEO  Payoff  Under  the  Constant-Share 
Approach 
  Social Value  CEO Payoff 
No transaction  V  πV 
Repurchase  V+X  π(V+X) 
Equity issuance  V+X  π(V+X) 
     
 
Thus,  CEO  has  an  incentive  to  undertake  a  repurchase  or  equity 
issuance iff X > 0.  That is, CEO would undertake the transaction if and only 
if it increases ABC’s social value. 
 
Ex Post Implementation 
 
Until now it has been assumed that CEO participates pro rata in any 
equity  transaction  at  T=1.    Thus,  because  CEO  owns  π  share  of  ABC’s 
equity, she would sell or buy πα share when ABC buys or sells α share.  
Under this constant-share approach, CEO’s payoff would be tied to ABC’s 
social value. 
 
However,  CEO’s  payoff  could  also  be  tied  to  ABC’s  social  value 
through the use of an ex post adjustment made to CEO’s position after the 
equity transaction takes place.  Denote as βπ the amount of shares CEO must 
sell  (or  buy)  after  ABC’s  repurchase  (or  equity  offering)  in  order  to  tie 
CEO’s payoff to ABC’s social value.  Such an ex post adjustment would 2011]  The Optimal Design of Equity Pay  1147 
 
 
 
change the amount of equity outstanding at T=2 and ABC’s T=2 value. (For 
simplicity, I assume that the ex post adjustment itself has no efficiency effect 
and therefore no effect on ABC’s social value.) 
 
Suppose  ABC  repurchases  α  share  at  T=1  for  price  P1,  and  then 
(between T=1 and T=2) CEO sells βπ share for price P1. 
 
Denote  CEO’s  payoff  in  a  repurchase  when  there  is  an  ex  post 
adjustment as Wr′.  Because ABC’s value at T=2 will be V − [ + βπ]P1 + X, 
and ABC will have 1 – α − βπ share outstanding, it follows that 
 
(10) Wr′ = βπP1 +  π(V − [ + βπ]P1 + X)/(1 − α − βπ).  
 
Aligning CEO’s payoff with ABC’s social value requires that Wr′ = Wr, 
which in turn implies that 
 
(11) Wr′= π(V + X). 
 
From (10) and (11), it follows that 
 
(12) β = α/(1 − π). 
 
Thus, after ABC’s repurchase of α share at T=1, requiring CEO to sell 
ABC  α/(1  −  π)  share  will  ensure  CEO’s  proportional  ownership  remains 
unchanged.It can easily be shown that the post-transaction adjustment in the 
case of an equity issuance is identical: CEO must buy βπ share at P1, where β 
= α/(1 − π). 